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Abstract
This paper is focused on couple households where the wife is the main earner. The eco-
nomic literature on this subject is particularly scant. According to our estimates, the wife
was the main earner in one of every six couple households in France in 2002, including
wife-sole-earner households. The proportion of wives outearning their husbands was 18%
for dual-earners. About 24% of American women in dual-earner households earned more
than their husband in 2004. Using a model of household labour supply behaviour, we show
that households where the wife is the main earner may come about either because the hus-
band has a weaker preference for work than his wife, due possibly to her high wage, or
because he is hit by adverse circumstances, such as, for example, a decline in the demand
for men with his particular qualifications. Positive assortative mating may also come into
play. Our empirical model specifies spouse labour-market participation equations within each
household, endogenizing wages and allowing for random eﬀects and correlations in spouses’
unobservables. We conclude that the determinants of wife-sole-earner households are quite
distinct from those for dual-earner households where she outearns him. The probability of
observing the first seems to be more related to labour market diﬃculties of the husband,
while the latter is not. Dual-earners where she outearns him are more likely to be found
among higher educated couples, and especially, among couple where the wife’s education
level is high.
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1 Introduction
The economic literature on couple households where the wife is the main earner is partic-
ularly scant. The paucity of studies in this area contrasts sharply with the huge literature on
lone mothers.
About 24% of American women in dual-earner households earned more than their husband
in 2004 (Winkler, 1998, Bureau of Labor, 2004). This figure is about the same for Canada
(Sussman and Bonnell, 2006). The proportion of female breadwinners was also quite remarkable
in Australia at about the same time (Drago et al., 2004). According to our estimates, 18% of
wives outearned their husbands in French dual-earner households in 2002.
The analysis of households with the wife as the main earner has mainly been carried out
by non-economists. In the United States, two popular best-sellers have considered this issue:
Minetor (2002) and Pappenheim and Graves (2005), both based on a series of interviews with
‘female breadwinners’ and their husbands, find a great deal of conflict between spouses in some
of these households. Drago et al. (2004) look at the existence and persistence of situations
of ‘female breadwinnership’ in Australia. The authors conclude that when wives’ superior
earnings result from economic factors, husbands tend to have low socio-economic status, a poor
labour market position and few family committments; however, when they are associated with
the gender equity principles of spouses, the husband’s characteristics are often more positive.
Brennan et al. (2001) investigate the impact of earnings dominance on the quality of the
spouse’s marital role, where the latter is measured via a 52-item scale, including separation.
They conclude that changes in wives’ earnings do not aﬀect marital role quality, but that the
reverse is true for men: changes in men’s earnings are positively correlated with the quality of
marital roles.
From the economist’s point of view, the policy implications of the wife’s earning dominance
within the household are particularly relevant. Many policies are still implicitly targeted at
male-breadwinner households, which are no longer the rule. The literature shows, for example,
that joint taxation1 and tax credits discourage the labour market participation of secondary
earners (Eissa and Williamson Hoynes, 2004, Apps and Rees, 2005, Apps, 2006, Stancanelli,
1 See Bourguignon and Magnac (1990) for an analysis of the impact of taxation on the labour supply of
French spouses, using the French Labour Force Surveys.
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2008). If some men are the secondary earner in the household, any disincentive eﬀects may
apply to them too. Parental leave policies and part-time work are by and large used by
women. If all the distortions on the labour-market participation of (married) women were
removed, the proportion of ‘female breadwinners’ may well increase. Further, if women are the
sole household earners due to adverse circumstances befalling their husband, (low-educated)
‘female breadwinners’ may not bring enough income home to meet household needs. Finally,
the non-economics literature underlines the conflict within some of the households where the
wife is the main earner. Acknowledging their existence will probably make these situations less
conflictual.
Using a model of household labour supply behaviour, we show that households where the
wife is the main earner may come about either because the husband has a weaker preference for
work than his wife, due possibly to her high (potential) wage, or because he is hit by adverse
circumstances, such as, for example, a decline in the demand for men with his particular
qualifications. Here positive assortative mating, defined as the positive association between
spouses’ socio-economic characteristics, may also come into play. Pencavel (1998) relates the
rising education rates of women, and the positive correlation between spouses’ education levels,
to the increase in the number of dual-earners in the United States. The same factors may well
contribute to explain the incidence of households where the wife is the main earner. Winkler
(1998) observes that the process of assortative mating is associated with considerable variance
in earnings of the two spouses. We expect positive assortative mating to be positively correlated
with dual earnership, but one cannot a priori characterize its correlation to households where
the wife is the main earner.
It is the goal of this paper to shed light on the determinants of the wife’s earning dominance.
Is this explained by the high education of women or rather by husbands’ diﬃculties in the labour
market? Is positive assortative mating of spouses correlated with wives’ earning dominance?
Do the same factors lie behind households where she is the sole earner or dual-earners where
she outearns him? To answer these questions, we specify an econometric model of spouses’
labour market decisions, whereby we jointly model the employment states of the two spouses
and their wages, allowing for random eﬀects and for correlations between spouses’ unobservable
characteristics. The advantage of this approach over a structural model of household behaviour
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is its flexibility, as it does not impose any a priori restrictions on behaviour. It is consistent with
the unitary approach but also with a collective model of household behaviour. We are then able
to test for the impact of potential wages on labour market outcomes of spouses. In particular,
we can disentangle the eﬀect of her and his education on wages and labour market outcomes.
We account for positive assortative mating of spouses, by means of a series of proxies for whether
spouses enjoy the same education level or belong to the same socio-economic profession and by
using an indicator of spouses’ age diﬀerence -we assume that smaller age diﬀerences proxy for
positive assortative mating. Our empirical model also controls for macro-economic trends and
the local labour-market situation.
The sample for the analysis consists of 300,000 French couples drawn from the French Labour
Force Surveys of 1990 to 2002. The large sample size enables us to observe enough households
with the wife as the main earner. In particular, we observe 12,000 couples where the wife is the
sole earner and 35,000 dual-earner households where the wife outearns the husband. We exploit
the rotating structure of the survey, in which one-third of the sample is replaced each year -so
that a household stays in the sample for at most three years- to construct an unbalanced panel.
This allows us to include random eﬀects and various correlations in unobservables into the
model.
We find that, generally, higher-educated women are more likely to be main earners. Be-
cause of the increasing education of women, we may expect ‘female breadwinners’ to become
more common in the future. The determinants of wife-sole-earner households are quite distinct
from those for dual-earner households where the wife outearns her husband. The probability
of observing the first seems to be more related to the husband’s labour market diﬃculties,
while the latter is not. In particular, couples where the wife is the sole worker are more likely
to occur when husbands are low-educated, and more so if both spouses are low-educated. In-
stead, dual-earners where she outearns him are more likely to be found among higher educated
couples, and especially, among couple where her education level is high. We conclude that
positive assortative mating of spouses significantly increases the probability that the wife out-
earns her husband but it reduces the incidence of wife-sole-earnership. Spouses’ unobservable
characteristics and the correlation between them over time suggest considerable persistence in
behaviour.
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The structure of the paper is as follows. First, the theoretical framework is spelled out.
Next, the econometric model is presented. Section 4 presents the data and Section 5 provides
a descriptive analysis of spouses’ characteristics. The estimation results are found in Section
6, and Section 7 concludes.
2 A theoretical model of spouses’ employment statuses and
wages
This section presents the theoretical framework. The purpose of this exercise is not so much to
put forward an original model, but rather to single out the theoretical predictions concerning
the occurrence of couple households where the wife is the main earner.
All models of family labour supply consider the trade-oﬀ between income out of work, on
the one hand, and the merits of non-work time, on the other. This trade-oﬀ is the key to un-
derstanding household members’ work decisions. In our model, we do not consider bargaining
processes between household members; we also do not explicitly deal with household produc-
tion. Whenever we talk about the ‘value of non-work time’, this is also understood to include
time spent on household production.2
The subject of this study are households where the wife works and the husband does not,
and dual-earners where the wife outearns the husband. We therefore set up a theoretical model
in which employment is the choice variable for the household members.3
Employment opportunities
The choice set of household members is determined by employment opportunities, which are
driven by the demand side of the labour market. We denote an employment opportunity
for the husband by em = 1 (em = 0 if no employment is available). In the absence of an
employment opportunity, there is no choice and the individual stays out of work. We assume
that a job opportunity is available with probability pm = P (em = 1). For the wife, we denote
the employment opportunity by ef and its probability by pf .
The household’s objective function
The household has an objective function that depends on the labour market state of each
2 See Apps and Rees (1996 and 1997) on this issue.
3 Hours are not modelled here as they are not within the scope of the paper. Van Soest (1995) puts forward
a structural model of spouses’ hours’ choices.
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household member dj , with j = m, f , and on household consumption C.4 Let dj = 1 if spouse
j is working, dj = 0 otherwise. The objective function is:
U(dm, df , C) (1)
This expression represents a household utility function, as in a unitary model. Alternatively,
it can be interpreted as a household welfare function, and, more specifically, a Pareto-weighted
average of the utility functions of individual household members.5 The expression above is
also consistent with a cooperative model, in which the sum of the individual utility functions
is maximized. The expression (1) may depend on taste shifters that influence the valuation of
non-work time, as well as on random variables.6
Properties of the household objective function
We assume that the objective function has the following properties:
U(0, df , C) > U(1, df , C) and U(dm, 0, C) > U(dm, 1, C) (2)
The conditions in (2) state that non-work time is preferred to work time.
The marginal utility of consumption is positive:
∂U(dm, df , C)
∂C
> 0 (3)
We next assume that the utility gain of non-work time compared to work time is greater at
higher consumption levels:
U(0, df , C)− U(1, df , C) < U(0, df , C¯)− U(1, df , C¯) if C < C¯ (4)
and
U(dm, 0, C)− U(dm, 1, C) < U(dm, 0, C¯)− U(dm, 1, C¯) if C < C¯ (5)
This condition is synonymous with a diminishing marginal rate of substitution between
non-work time and consumption.
4 The model does not explicitly consider private consumption goods for individual household members. This
would not provide any additional insights into the income-leisure trade-oﬀ. Distinguishing private consumption
goods is important in intra-household bargaining models.
5 See, for example, Bloemen (2004) for a collective model specification that allows for non-participation.
6 Here we supress any notation for taste shifters or random eﬀects. These last enter into the empirical model.
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The household budget constraint
Let wj , j = m, f be the (potential) labour income of spouse j. The household budget constraint
is:
C = dmwm + dfwf (6)
Non-labour income is not explicitly considered.7
Mazimization
Household members choose dm, df ∈ {0, 1} to maximize the objective function (1) subject to
the budget constraint (6).
Dual-earners where the wife outearns the husband
The model characterizes dual-earners where the wife outearns her husband as follows. First
of all, two conditions have to be met: (i) (dm, df ) = (1, 1) must prevail as the outcome of
the maximisation process; and (ii) wf > wm. This last condition is driven by spouses’ (po-
tential) earnings, which are determined outside the model. For example, potential earnings
will reflect diﬀerential investments in human capital, experience, and the relevant industrial
sector or occupational opportunities. A necessary condition for (dm, df ) = (1, 1) is that both
household members have employment opportunities: (em, ef ) = 1. Thus, demand side factors
may influence the outcome. Given the job opportunities available, both household members
will opt to be employed if:
U(1, 1, wm + wf ) > U(0, 1, wf )
U(1, 1, wm + wf ) > U(1, 0, wm)
U(1, 1, wm + wf ) > U(0, 0, 0)
(7)
The first condition above shows the trade-oﬀ between the value of labour income wm, if the
husband works, and the value of non-work time. We can also write this as
U(0, 1, wm +wf )− U(1, 1, wm + wf) < U(0, 1, wm + wf )− U(0, 1, wf ) (8)
The left-hand side of (8) can be interpreted as the utility gain from non-work time relative
to work time, which is positive according to (2). The right-hand side is the utility gain from
higher consumption that results from greater labour income wm, which is positive according
7 The data to hand do not contain this information. In the empirical analysis, we specify wj , with j = m, f
as equal to the wage rate.
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to (3). Therefore, (8) shows that the utility gain from higher labour income is larger than the
utility gain due to non-work time: earnings from work are worth more to the husband than
the corresponding value of non-work time. The same holds for the wife, as described by the
second condition in (10): her earnings from work must exceed the value of non-work time.
We can observe dual-earner households where the wife outearns her husband when the wife’s
(potential) wage is relatively high. Now, it would be too simplistic to characterize dual-earners
as high-earnings individuals. Conditions (4) and (5) indicate that the value of non-work time
increases with household consumption. This means, for example, that if the husband is a
high-wage earner, the value of leisure of the wife is higher. This would, in turn, decrease
her incentives to work unless her wage-income is so high as to be greater than the value of
non-work time. Other mechanisms may also be at work. We do not explicitly model intra-
household bargaining here, but being employed and bringing in one’s own labour income might
also translate into a better bargaining position. This could be an additional incentive for him to
work even when his wife enjoys substantial labour income. Further, positive assortative mating
may matter: individuals with similar caracteristics, and notably similar preferences for work,
may tend to marry each other. Positive assortative mating is bound to be positively correlated
with dual earnership, but one cannot a priori characterize its correlation to wife-outearning
dual-earners, nor to wife-sole-earner households.
Wife sole-earner
We now consider households where the wife is the sole earner as her husband does not work.
This could arise under two diﬀerent scenarios. First, it could be that the husband has not
received an opportunity to work, em = 0, and is out of work by constraint rather than choice.
His wife opts to work. It follows that:
U(0, 1, wf ) > U(0, 0, 0) (9)
Either the value of non-work time is relatively low for the wife (see equation 5) or she may
choose to work even though her wage is not very high, because her husband does not bring in
any income. This case corresponds to the so called ‘added worker eﬀect’.
Under the alternative scenario the observed outcome is the result of choice. The husband
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may well have a job opportunity (em = 1), but with a low wage relative to his value of leisure:
U(0, 1, wf ) > U(1, 1, wm +wf )
U(0, 1, wf ) > U(1, 0, wm)
U(0, 1, wf ) > U(0, 0, 0)
(10)
The wife might, for example, be a high-wage worker, which could increase the value of her
husband’s leisure.
We can therefore observe households where the wife works and the husband is out of work
under two diﬀerent scenarios: in the first, the husband would like to work but there are no
employment opportunities; in the second, the wife’s high (potential) wage lies behind the
outcome.
3 The empirical model
We specify employment and wage equations for husbands and wives within the same household.
The advantage of this approach is that wages are estimated simultaneously with employment
outcomes. This model does not impose any a priori restrictions on spouses’ behaviour. It is
consistent with the unitary approach but also with a collective model of household behaviour. In
addition to this, we are able to include in the model individuals for whom wages are not observed
(see model full specification in the Appendix). For each household, we model the employment
and the wage rate of husband and wife and their correlations. We include random eﬀects in
the employment and wage equations. These represent unobserved individual heterogeneity,
such as, for example, unobserved preferences and characteristics. This specification allows us
to estimate the probability that the wife outearns her husband in dual-earner households. We
can also make inferences about persistence in labour market and wages outcomes.
Let djit denote the labour market status of spouse j = m,f , where m stands for husbands
and f for wives, and i = 1, ..., N denotes the couple, and t = 1, ..., T time. Let djit = 1 if the
individual is employed, djit = 0 otherwise. Labour-market status is explained by observable
characteristics zjit, j = m, f , an unobserved random eﬀect αji, j = m, f , and an idiosyncratic
error, jit, j = m, f :
d∗jit = γj 0zjit + αji + jit, j = m, f, t = 1, ..., T, i = 1, ...,N
djit = ι(d∗jit > 0)
(11)
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Wage rates, wjit, depend on observed characteristics xjit, a random eﬀect, ωji, and an
idiosyncratic error, ujit, j = m, f :
lnwjit = η0jxjit + ωji + ujit, (12)
with j = m,f, t = 1,...,T, and i = 1,..., N.
We assume that the random eﬀects of the employment and wage equations are identically
and independently normally distributed across households. We allow for correlation between
the wage and employment statuses of each pair of spouses:
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Similar assumptions are made for the idiosyncratic errors:
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To construct the likelihood function, we determine the joint probability of the observed
labour market statuses of the household members in each year and the joint density of their
wage rates. The likelihood contributions for diﬀerent observations are given in Appendix A.
4 The French labour force surveys
The analysis sample is drawn from the French Labor Force Surveys (LFS) from 1990 to
2002. We cannot extend our analysis to more recent years, as the LFS series was broken in 2003
to comply with the harmonization requirements of the European Union statistical oﬃces.8 The
LFS surveys up to year 2002 had a rotating-sample structure which enables us to construct a
longitudinal sample. Around 60,000 households were interviewed in the March of each year,
with a third of the sample being replaced each year. All household members were interviewed,
and interviews were carried out in the respondents’ household. For our analysis, we select a
sample of individuals with the following characteristics:
8 The new LFS series started in 2003. It is now carried out on a continuous-time basis instead of once a year
for the older series. Further, the questionnaire has been modified substantially and the questions on employment
status are not directly comparable to those from the older surveys.
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- they reported that they were the household head or the spouse of the head;
- they were aged between 16 and 54;
- they were not doing their military service;
- and they were not self-employed.
The self-employed were dropped from the sample as no earnings were recorded for them. The
sample cut at 55 is designed to exclude households with (early) retirees.
The records for husbands and wives within the same household were then matched to each
other. We include both married and unmarried couples in the sample. Records for which either
the husband or the wife were not interviewed were dropped. Records for which the partner
changed over time were dropped, although these represented only very few observations, about
70 in all. The final sample consisted of roughly 23,000 couples for each of the years considered.
Observations relating to the diﬀerent years were pooled together over time to construct the
analysis sample, which contains only couples.
Labour market status is self-reported. The non-employed include the unemployed and other
inactive individuals, such as ‘housewives’. The survey collects information on current monthly
wage, measured at the time of the survey. Wages are gross of (before) income tax but net of
(after) employers’ and employees’ social security contributions. Information on usual hours of
work, asked at the time of the survey, is used to construct hourly wage rates. Wages lower than
half of the minimum (hourly) wage were set to missing. Earnings information is only collected
for salaried workers. No information is collected on non-labour income in the survey.
We construct a series of completed-education dummies. These increase in education level,
with level 1 corresponding to at most the compulsory education level. The omitted category is
the highest education level, a university or higher degree. The survey also collects information
on the individual’s two-digit socio-economic and professional category. We construct a series of
variables which account for any positive relationship between the socio-economic characteristics
of the spouses as follows:
- a dummy which equals one if the two spouses enjoy the same level of completed education,
and zero otherwise;
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- an interaction variable of the above dummy for the same education with an individual dummy
for low-education; this new variable is, then, equal to one when both spouses are low-
educated and zero otherwise;
- a dummy which equals one if the two spouses belong to the same socio-economic and profes-
sional category, and zero otherwise;
- a dummy which equals one if the husband is more than five years older than his wife, and
zero otherwise; and
- a dummy which equals one if the wife is more than five years older than her husband, and
zero otherwise.
These last two dummies pick up larger than average spousal age diﬀerences: the mean age
diﬀerence between spouses is two years with a standard deviation of around three years. Positive
assortative mating is likely to be associated with smaller age diﬀerences.
We also construct cohort dummies, as follows:
- the first cohort includes the generations born after 1964;
- the second cohort consists of individuals born between 1955 and 1964;
- and the reference group consists of individuals born before 1955.
Finally, we account for the number of children and the presence of children aged under
three. Almost 100% of children aged three and older are at (kindergarten) school in France.
This is available to everyone and free of charge, and so is not rationed.
Local labour market conditions are captured by the region of residence and size of area of
residence dummies. Small cities include rural neighbourhoods or urban neighbourhoods with
less than 20,000 inhabitants; large cities are those with more than 200,000 inhabitants; Paris
stands on its own. The reference group is medium-size cities with populations of 20,000 to
200,000 inhabitants.
5 Descriptive analysis for diﬀerent types of households
We distinguish households according to the spouses’ labour market status and their wage, as
follows:
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- husband-sole-earner or ‘male-breadwinner’ households;
- wife-sole-earner or ‘female-breadwinner’ households;9
- dual-earners;
- dual-earners with the wife outearning her husband;
- out-of-work spouses, where the state of being ‘out-of-work’ includes all non-employment
states, including unemployment and inactivity.
Table 1 shows the evolution of these diﬀerent types of households over time. The propor-
tion of husband-sole-earners (conventionally, male-breadwinner households) has declined over
time, falling from 35% in 1990 to 25% in 2002. Male-breadwinner households account for an
important share of the population. They represented about a quarter of all households in
2002. However, the majority of households are dual-earners. The proportion of dual-earners
increased over the period considered by 9 percentage points, from 58% in 1990 to 67% in 2002.
The proportion of women outearning their husbands increased by three percentage points over
the period considered, according to the comparison of spouses’ gross10 hourly (monthly, W)
wages, w. In 2002, women outearned their husbands in almost one out of every five dual-earner
households. In the same year, women outearned their husbands in more than one out of every
ten households in the population.11
Descriptive statistics are provided for the full sample in Table 2. Table 2 also shows descrip-
tive statistics for dual-earners and for households where both spouses are out of work. Table 3
provides descriptive statistics for male-breadwinner and female-breadwinner households. Table
4 focuses on dual-earners, split up into ‘conventional’ dual-earner households - where the hus-
band earns more than his wife - and ‘wife-outearning’ households - where the wife earns at least
the same wage as her husband. Here, earnings are defined as gross monthly earnings, before
9 In some of the earlier literature, and in other parts of our paper, the term ‘female breadwinners’ includes,
more loosely, any household with the wife as the main earner.
10 Wages are gross of (before) income tax but net of (after) employers’ and employees’ social security
contributions.
11 Women outearned their husbands in about 12% (10%) of the population of households considered, according
to hourly (monthly) wages. In particular, about 67% (80%) of women who outearned their husbands on the
basis of observed hourly (monthly) wages, also did so according to monthly (hourly) wages.
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tax, and without adjusting for hours of work. Table 5 shows the summary statistics of the
distribution of gross monthly earnings of husbands and wives in diﬀerent types of households.
Men in ‘conventional’ dual-earners households - where the husband earns more than the
wife - have higher average gross earnings than male breadwinners.12 Men in ‘unconventional’
dual-earner households, who are outearned by their wives, have lower average gross earnings
than the average over the full sample, while their outearning wives earn, on average, much more
than do other wives in the population. ‘Outearning’ wives have a similar earnings distribution
to ‘outearning’ men in the sample (see Table 5).
The average age diﬀerence between spouses in the sample is about two years (see Table
2). Men in wife-outearning households are on average one year younger than men in other
household types (see Table 4). Husbands are more likely to be much older than their wife (more
than five years older) in ‘sole-worker’ households (19-21% of husbands are in this situation, see
Table 3) and when both spouses are out of work (28%) than in dual-earner households (13%, see
Table 2). Younger cohorts of men, born after 1964, are over-represented in female-breadwinner
couples and wife-outearning dual-earners (24% and 27% respectively, against 22% for the full
sample). Younger cohorts of women are more likely to be found amongst both-out-of-work
spouses (34%, against 29% for the full sample). Because wives are, on average, younger than
their husbands, we find relatively more women in the younger cohort. Dual-earner spouses
are more likely to belong to the same socio-occupational category (12% of ‘conventional’ dual-
earners and 16% of ‘unconventional’ ones are in this situation) than are spouses in male-
breadwinner households (2%). Women outearning their husbands are more likely to be higher
educated. Marriage is more frequent for male-breadwinner households (84%) and ‘conventional’
dual-earners (80%) than for wife-outearning couples (74%) or female-breadwinners (68%). The
average number of children in the household is two for both-out-of-work spouses and male-
breadwinner households. It is a little over one in wife-outearning households. The proportion of
children under three is also highest among out-of-work spouses and male-breadwinner couples.
Female-breadwinner and wife-outearning households are more likely to live in inner Paris
(19% and 17%, respectively) than are male-breadwinner couples (12%) and couples where both
spouses are out of work (12%). ’Conventional’ dual-earners are somewhere in the middle, with
12 Although taxation may partly cancel these diﬀerences out.
13
15% of them living in inner Paris. Concerning nationality, it is striking that just above 70%
of spouses are French when both are out of work, against over 90% for dual-earner and 87%
for male-breadwinner households. Further, in both-out-of-work, female-breadwinner and wife-
outearning households, husbands are on average about 3 percentage points less likely to be
French than their wife.
6 Results of estimation: marginal eﬀects of the covariates on
the probabilities of ‘female breadwinnership’
According to our theoretical predictions, households where the wife is the main earner may
come about either because the husband has a weaker preference for work than his wife, due
possibly to her high (potential) wage, or because he is hit by adverse circumstances, such as, for
example, a decline in the demand for men with his particular qualifications. Estimates of the
eﬀect of husbands’ and wives’ education on the probability of observing a female-breadwinner
household may help us to distinguish between these competing hypotheses. Higher levels of
education may proxy for higher wages as well as better employment opportunities. Equally,
lower education may capture lower wages and, possibly, poorer employment opportunities. In
addition, we include year dummies to measure other year-specific eﬀects, using 1990 as the
reference year.13 Further, wife-sole-earner households could be quite distinct from dual-earner
households where the wife outearns her husband. To capture the impact of demand side factors
on employment, we also include gender-specific unemployment rates. Finally, we expect positive
assortative mating to be positively correlated with dual earnership, but we can not a priori
characterize its correlation to wife-outearning dual-earners or wife-sole-earner households.
The estimation results for the coeﬃcients γm and γf in the employment equations (equation
11) are given in Table A, in the Appendix, together with the estimates of the coeﬃcients in
the wage equations (equation 12)in Table B. The regressors of the wage equation include
experience, which is measured by the number of years since completion of education. Since the
age of completion varies with the level of education, we also include cross eﬀects of education
and experience. The impact of the covariates on the employment probabilities and the wages of
husbands and wives follow standard patterns. Table C provides the estimates of the parameters
13 We have normalized 1991 and 1992 to zero.
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of the covariance matrices in (13) and (14). For ease of interpretation, we have reparametrized
the covariance matrices in terms of correlation coeﬃcients14. Most of the estimated correlation
coeﬃcients are significantly diﬀerent from zero. In particular, the estimate of ρf,αω is quite
large, indicating a strong and persistent correlation between the wage rate and the labour
market status of wives.
The empirical model fits well the data according to the predicted probabilities. These
were computed for each household type and averaged over time (see Table 6). They are
very close to the actual probabilities that were shown in the last line of Table 1. The model
slightly overpredicts the probability of observing wife-outearning dual-earners. The predicted
probability is 0.26 while the observed probability is 0.20.
Therefore, we go ahead and use the estimation results of the model, shown in the Appen-
dix, to derive the marginal eﬀects of the covariates on the probabilities of the occurrence of
‘female-breadwinners’ households. These marginal estimates are shown in Table 7 for diﬀerent
household types with respect to spouses’ labour market status and wages15.
The second column of Table 7 relates to households where the wife is the sole worker.16 The
probability of observing this type of household increases with the wife’s education level but
falls with the husband’s education level. The latter eﬀect is greater, in absolute value, than
the first. On average, if the husband has the lowest education level -compulsory education or
less- the probability that the wife be the sole worker increases by 6% points. This probability
increases further, by 4% points, if both spouses are low-educated, having completed at most
compulsory education. On the contrary, the marginal eﬀect of the variable for spouses enjoying
the same (above compulsory schooling) education is negative. Similarly, belonging to the same
socio-economic profession negatively aﬀects this probability. These results indicate that couples
where the wife is the sole worker are very likely to occur when husbands are low-educated, and
even more if both spouses are low-educated.
14 For instance, for the employment equation, the correlation coeﬃcient of unobservables over time is equal to
σ2α,j/(σ
2
α,j+1), j = m, f . This equals 0.23 for husbands and 0.63 for wives. In the wage equation, the correlation
in unobservables is given by σ2ω,j/(σ
2
ω,j + τ
2
j ), j = m, f , which equals 0.80 for husbands and 0.86 for wives.
15 To compute the marginal probabilities, the covariates of continuous and count variables were set equal to
their sample means. To compute the marginal eﬀects of age (experience) we increased the sample mean of age
(experience) by one year. Dummy variables have been set at their reference values, so the marginal eﬀects show
deviations from the reference category.
16 The probability that the wife be the sole worker in the household equals P (dm = 0, df = 1).
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The age of either husband or wife does not have a large influence and cohorts eﬀects are also
quite small. But the larger the age diﬀerence between the spouses, the stronger the probability.
This reinforce the findings that this probability is negatively associated with positive assortative
mating.
The gender-specific unemployment rates do not have a significant impact on the probability
that the wife be the sole earner. In particular, the marginal eﬀect of male unemployment
rate is positive but not significant. Finally, the largest marginal eﬀects are those relating the
husband’s nationality, with French nationality having a negative impact, and marital status,
with being unmarried having a positive impact.
For reference purposes, we show in the third column of Table 7 the probability of observing
a male-breadwinner household. It can be seen that, analogously, this falls the higher the
education level of the wife.
We next consider the marginal impact of the covariates on the probability of observing
a ‘wife-outearning’ dual-earner household17, which is shown in the final column of table 7.
Spouses’ education levels strongly aﬀect this probability, but in opposite directions. The wife’s
higher education increases the probability, while the husband’s higher education reduces it.
The coeﬃcients on the education dummies suggest that it is unlikely for women to outearn
their husband if the husband is high educated18. On the other hand, if spouses enjoy the
same level of education, above compulsory schooling, the probability increases, while it falls
if both spouses have at most compulsory education. Belonging to the same socio-economic
profession positively aﬀects this probability. Larger age diﬀerences reduce this probability -we
have assumed that smaller age diﬀerences proxy for positive assortative mating. Therefore, this
last set of results suggests that this probability is positively associated with positive assortative
mating of spouses. Being French increases it, and especially so if the husband is French. The
unemployment rate of the husband is not significant.
For reference purposes, we also show in the fourth column of Table 7 the unconditional
17 The probability that the wife outearns her husband equals P (dm = 1, dw = 1, wf > wm). The empirical
specification allows for the joint probability of satisfying (i) (dm, df ) = (1, 1) and (ii) wf > wm (conditions (i)
and (ii) in section 2.0.2).
18 Higher education of women increases not only the probability of observing dual-earners but also her potential
wage. Higher education of the husband increases the probability of observing dual-earners but decreases the
chances that she outearns him. For husbands, the marginal eﬀect of going from education level 6 (university
degree, which is the reference category) to the lower education level 5 is 0.201.
16
probability of observing dual-earners. This increases strongly with the education levels of
both husband and wife. A large age diﬀerence between husband and wife has a strongly
negative impact. Households where the wife belongs to the oldest cohort are less likely to be
dual-earners. Being married, not having French nationality, the number of children, and the
presence of young children all decrease the probability of observing dual-earners. A higher
unemployment rate of the husband (wife) increases (decreases) the probability of observing
dual-earners. The negative eﬀect of the wife’s unemployment rate is larger, in absolute value,
implying that if gender-specific unemployment rates increase by the same percentage, there
will be fewer dual-earners.
Tu sum up, our findings suggest that, generally, higher-educated women are more likely to
be the main earner. The determinants of wife-sole-earner households are quite distinct from
those for dual-earner households where the wife outearns her husband. The probability of
observing the first seems to be more related to labour market diﬃculties of the husband, while
the latter is not. In particular, wife-sole-earner are strongly correlated with low education level
of husbands. Instead, wife-outearning dual-earners are more likely to be found among higher
educated couples, and especially, among couple where the wife’s education level is high. We also
conclude that positive assortative mating of spouses significantly increases the probability that
the wife outearns her husband while it reduces wife-sole-earnership. Last, spouses’ unobservable
characteristics and the correlation between them over time suggest considerable persistence in
behaviour.
7 Conclusions
The aim of this paper is to shed light on the determinants of households where the wife is
the main earner. These represent about one of every six couple households in France over the
period considered, including wife-sole-earner households. The proportion of wives outearning
their husbands was 18% for dual-earners. About 24% of American women in dual-earner
households earned more than their husband in 2004. This figure is about the same for Canada.
The economic literature on households where the wife is the main earner is particularly scant.
We have set out the theoretical framework for the analysis, showing that these households may
come about either because the husband has a weaker preference for work than his wife or
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because he is hit by adverse circumstances, such as, for example, a decline in the demand for
men with his particular qualifications. Further, we expect positive assortative mating to be
positively correlated with dual earnership, but one cannot a priori characterize its correlation
to households where she is the main earner.
We have specified an empirical model whereby wages are estimated simultaneously with
employment outcomes for husband and wife within each household, and we have included
random eﬀects. Spouses for whom wages were not observed are included in this model. This
model does not impose any a priori restrictions on spouses’ behaviour. It is consistent with
the unitary approach but also with a collective model of household behaviour. The model
was estimated using data drawn from the French Labour Force Surveys over 1990-2002, which
have a rotating-panel structure. Our sample is made up of about three hundred thousand
households.
We conclude that, generally, higher-educated women are more likely to be the main earner.
The determinants of wife-sole-earner households are quite distinct from those for dual-earner
households where the wife outearns her husband. The probability of observing the first seems
to be more related to labour market diﬃculties of the husband, while the latter is not. In
particular, couples where the wife is the sole worker are more likely to occur when husbands
are low-educated, and even more so if both spouses are low-educated. Instead, dual-earners
where she outearns him are more likely to be found among higher educated couples, and
especially, among couple where her education level is high. We find that positive assortative
mating of spouses significantly increases the probability that the wife outearns her husband
but it reduces the likelihood of wife-sole-earnership. Last, spouses’ unobservable characteristics
and the correlation between them over time suggest considerable persistence in behaviour.
Because of the increasing education of women, we may expect ‘female breadwinners’ to
become more common in the future.
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A Likelihood contributions
The model equations (11) and (12) and the distributional assumptions (13) and (14) are used
to construct the likelihood contributions for the diﬀerent types of observations.
Consider a household i with both spouses employed in year t, (dmit = 1, dfit = 1), and where
wages, respectively, wmit and wfit, are observed for both spouses. Unobserved characteristics
are denoted by (αi, ωi)0. We first construct the probability that both spouses are employed,
conditional on the unobservables (αi, ωi)0
We define the covariance matrix of the idiosyncratic errors (14) as:
Ã
Σ Σu0
Σu Σu
!
≡
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 σmf, σm,u σmf,u
σmf, 1 σfm,u σf,u
σm,u σfm,u τ2m τmf
σmf,u σf,u τmf τ2f
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ (15)
We assume that the density distribution of the idiosyncratic errors of the employment
equation, mit = (mit, fit)0, conditional on the errors uit = (umit, ufit)0 of the wage equation,
is normal:
it|uit ∼ N(Σ0uΣ−1u uit,Σ −Σ0uΣ−1u Σu) (16)
Σ|u := Σ − Σ0uΣ−1u Σu :=
Ã
σ21 σ12
σ12 σ22
!
and
Ã
μ1(uit)
μ2(uit)
!
= Σ0uΣ
−1
u uit (17)
We write P (dm,it = 1, df,it = 1|wm,it, wf,it, αi, ωi).
The employment probability of spouse j (see equation (11)) is as follows:
djit = 1 if d∗jit = γ
0
jzjit + αji + jit > 0 or jit > −γ0jzjit − αji (18)
Given (18), (16) and (17), we can write:
P (dm,it = 1, df,it = 1|wm,it, wf,it, αi, ωi) =
Z ∞
−(z0fitγf+μ2(uit)+αfi)/σ2
Φ
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
z0mitγm + αmi + μ1(uit) +
σ12
σ2 νr
σ21 −
σ212
σ22
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
1√
2π
exp
½
−1
2
ν2
¾
dν (19)
with
ujit = lnwjit − η0jxjit − ωji, j = m, f
The joint density of wages, conditional on (αi, ωi)0 is then:
f(wmit, wfit|ωi, αi) = 1wmit, wfit2π|Σu|1/2
exp{−1
2
(lnwit − η0xit − ωi)0Σ−1u (lnwit − η0xit − ωi)}
(20)
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with η0xit ≡ (η0mxmit, η0fxfit)0 and lnwit ≡ (lnwmit, lnwfit)0. Finally, let lit(αi, ωi) be the joint
probability density of this household with (dmit = 1, dfit = 1, wmit, wfit):
lit(αi, ωi) = P (dmit = 1, dfit = 1|wmit, wfit, αi, ωi)× f(wmit, wfit|ωi, αi) (21)
Second, we consider households in which we observe the employment status of the spouses,
but not the wage rate (for either one or both spouses). This occurs if either monthly earnings
or usual hours of work are missing. The wage rate is also set to missing if it is less than
half of the mimimum wage (see the data section). Take first the case of dual-earners, (dmit =
1, dfit = 1, wfit), where we do not observe the husband’s wage rate. From (14) we know the
joint distribution of the idiosyncratic errors of the employment equation and the error of the
wife’s wage equation:
⎛
⎜⎝
m,it
f,it
uf,it
⎞
⎟⎠ ∼ N
⎛
⎜⎝
⎛
⎜⎝
0
0
0
⎞
⎟⎠ ,
⎛
⎜⎝
1 σmf, σmf,u
σmf, 1 σf,u
σmf,u σf,u τ2f
⎞
⎟⎠
⎞
⎟⎠ (22)
The conditional density of it on ufit is normalÃ
mit
fit
|ufit
!
∼ N
ÃÃ
μ1(uit)
μ2(uit)
!
,
Ã
σ21 σ12
σ12 σ22
!!
(23)
with
μ1(uit) =
σmf,u
τ2f
ufit
μ2(uit) =
σf,u
τ2f
ufit
σ21 = 1−
σ2mf,u
τ2f
σ12 = σmf,u − σmf,uσf,uτ2f
σ22 = 1−
σ2f,u
τ2f
(24)
We can then compute P (dmit = 1, dfit = 1|wfit, αi, ωi) as in expression (19), but applying
the conditional means and variances specified in the block (24). The complete likelihood
contribution, l(αit, ωit)0 for this household in year t, is obtained by multiplying this probability
by the marginal density of the wife’s wage, conditional on the unobservables.
Similarly, we can construct the likelihood contribution of dual-earner households where the
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wife’s wage is missing. The relevant conditional means and variances are:
μ1(uit) =
σm,u
τ2m
umit
μ2(uit) =
σfm,u
τ2m
ufit
σ21 = 1−
σ2m,u
τ2m
σ12 = σmf,u − σfm,uσm,uτ2m
σ22 = 1−
σ2fm,u
τ2m
(25)
For dual-earner households with missing wages for both spouses, we write:
P (dm,it = 1, df,it = 1|αi, ωi) =Z ∞
−(z0fitγf+αfi)
Φ
⎛
⎝z
0
mitγm + αmi + σmf,νq
1− σ2mf,
⎞
⎠ 1√
2π
exp
½
−1
2
ν2
¾
dν (26)
Third, we construct the likelihood contribution of wife-sole-earner households when we
observe the wage:
P (dm,it = 0, df,it = 1|wf,it, αi, ωi) =
Z ∞
−(z0fitγf+μ2(uit)+αfi)/σ2
⎡
⎢⎢⎣1− Φ
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
z0mitγm + αmi + μ1(uit) +
σ12
σ2 νr
σ21 −
σ212
σ22
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
1√
2π
exp
½
−1
2
ν2
¾
dν (27)
with the conditional means and variances defined as in block (24). The likelihood contribu-
tion for this household in year t, conditional on the random eﬀects, lit(αi, ωi), is obtained by
multiplying this probability by the marginal distribution of the wife’s wage.
If information on the wife’s wage, wfit, is missing, we write
P (dm,it = 0, df,it = 1|αi) =Z ∞
−(z0fitγf+αfi)
⎡
⎣1− Φ
⎛
⎝z
0
mitγm + αmi + σmf,νq
1− σ2mf,
⎞
⎠
⎤
⎦ 1√
2π
exp
½
−1
2
ν2
¾
dν (28)
Fourth, the likelihood contribution of a male-breadwinner household with observed wages
can be written as:
P (dm,it = 1, df,it = 0|wm,it, αi, ωi) =
Z −(z0fitγf+μ2(uit)+αfi)/σ2
−∞
Φ
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
z0mitγm + αmi + μ1(uit) +
σ12
σ2
νr
σ21 −
σ212
σ22
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
1√
2π
exp
½
−1
2
ν2
¾
dν (29)
where the conditional means and variances are defined by (25). The likelihood contribution,
lit(αi, ωi) for this household in year t, conditional on random eﬀects, is obtained by multiplying
this probability by the marginal distribution of the husband’s wage.
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If the husband’s wage is not observed, the likelihood contribution is:
P (dm,it = 1, df,it = 0|αi) =
Z −(z0fitγf+αfi)
−∞
Φ
⎛
⎝z
0
mitγm + αmi + σmf,νq
1− σ2mf,
⎞
⎠ 1√
2π
exp
½
−1
2
ν2
¾
dν (30)
Finally, we look at the case of spouses who are both out of work. Their likelihood contribution
is determined as follows:
P (dm,it = 0, df,it = 0|αi) =Z −(z0fitγf+αfi)
−∞
⎡
⎣1− Φ
⎛
⎝z
0
mitγm + αmi + σmf,νq
1− σ2mf,
⎞
⎠
⎤
⎦ 1√
2π
exp
½
−1
2
ν2
¾
dν (31)
Having constructed the likelihood contributions for diﬀerent types of households in a given
year, conditional on the random eﬀects (αi, ωi), lit(αi, ωi), we now see how these change when
the household is observed for more than one year. Households stay in the sample for at most
three years. If either spouse does not answer the survey, the household is dropped from the
sample. If one of the spouses changes over time, then the household is also dropped (see the
data section for more details). Take a household i that is observed from year Ti1 to year Ti2.
Its likelihood contribution, conditional on random eﬀects, is
li(αi, ωi) =
Ti2Y
t=Ti1
lit(αi, ωi) (32)
Finally, we complete the likelihood function by integrating over the random eﬀects. Let
f(αi, ωi) denote the joint normal density of the random eﬀects (see expression (13)). The
complete likelihood contribution for household i is then:
li =
Z ∞
−∞
Z ∞
−∞
li(αi, ωi)f(αi, ωi)dαidωi (33)
where both αi and ωi have dimension 2. It follows that the computation of the likelihood
contributions requires up to five-dimensional integration, depending on the type of household
observed. We use the method of simulated maximum likelihood (SML) to estimate the model,
replacing integration by simulation (see Bo¨rsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou, 1993). We use 20
replications for each observation to simulate the integrals.
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Table 1: The evolution of household types
Years a) Male b) Female c) Dual d) Both e) f)
breadw. breadw. earners out-of-work Wf>Wm(*) wf>wm(**)
1990 0.35 0.03 0.58 0.04 0.15 0.18
1991 0.33 0.03 0.60 0.04 0.14 0.17
1992 0.32 0.03 0.60 0.04 0.15 0.18
1993 0.31 0.05 0.59 0.05 0.17 0.20
1994 0.31 0.05 0.59 0.05 0.18 0.22
1995 0.30 0.04 0.61 0.04 0.18 0.22
1996 0.30 0.04 0.61 0.04 0.16 0.18
1997 0.30 0.04 0.61 0.04 0.17 0.21
1998 0.29 0.04 0.62 0.04 0.16 0.20
1999 0.28 0.04 0.63 0.04 0.16 0.19
2000 0.27 0.04 0.64 0.04 0.18 0.21
2001 0.26 0.03 0.66 0.04 0.18 0.21
2002 0.25 0.04 0.67 0.04 0.18 0.21
90-02 0.30 0.04 0.62 0.04 0.17 0.20
These are unweighted sample figures.
Male (female) breadwinners are defined as husband(wife)-sole-earner couples.
(*) Households with Wf>Wm are a subsample of dual-earners;
W stands for monthly before-tax wages;
(**) Households with wf>wm are a subsample of dual-earners;
w stands for hourly before-tax wages.
For each line, a) + b) + c) + d) sums to one.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics: dual-earners and out-of-work couples
Variable Sample Dual-earners Both out of work
N =306571 N = 189506 N = 13150
Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Mean St Dev
F Age 37.11 8.26 37.33 8.15 36.36 9.02
M Age 39.29 8.24 39.27 8.18 39.60 8.99
M is > 5 years older 0.16 0.37 0.13 0.34 0.28 0.45
F is > 5 years older 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.16 0.04 0.21
F Education level 1(lowest) 0.31 0.46 0.23 0.42 0.65 0.48
F Education level 2 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.28 0.07 0.25
F Education level 3 0.27 0.44 0.28 0.45 0.17 0.38
F Education level 4 0.135 0.34 0.16 0.36 0.06 0.24
F Education level 5 0.12 0.32 0.15 0.36 0.03 0.17
M Education level 1(lowest) 0.28 0.45 0.23 0.42 0.58 0.49
M Education level 2 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.25 0.05 0.22
M Education level 3 0.36 0.48 0.37 0.48 0.25 0.43
M Education level 4 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.32 0.05 0.22
M Education level 5 0.08 0.28 0.10 0.30 0.03 0.17
Married 0.80 0.40 0.79 0.41 0.72 0.45
Number of children 1.56 1.21 1.35 1.03 2.07 1.71
Children, age < 3 0.16 0.37 0.12 0.33 0.24 0.73
Ile de France 0.17 0.38 0.18 0.39 0.13 0.34
Paris 0.14 0.35 0.16 0.36 0.12 0.32
F French nationality 0.91 0.28 0.95 0.22 0.74 0.44
M French nationality 0.90 0.30 0.94 0.24 0.71 0.45
Same socio-economic class 0.09 0.28 0.12 0.32 0.24 0.43
Same education level 0.41 0.48 0.39 0.49 0.58 0.49
F cohort born after 1964 0.29 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.34 0.47
M cohort born after 1964 0.22 0.41 0.22 0.41 0.23 0.42
F cohort born 1955-1964 0.38 0.48 0.38 0.49 0.34 0.47
M cohort born 1955-1964 0.36 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.32 0.47
F Monthly gross W, Euros 1062 967 1062 927
M Monthly gross W, Euros 1506 1219 1512 1132
These are unweighted figures, averaged over the thirteen-year period 1990-2002.
Current wages are averaged only over positive values. They are measured in Euros
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Table 3: Summary Statistics: male and female breadwinners
Variable Male breadwinners Female breadwinners
N = 91600 N =12315
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
F Age 36.76 8.28 37.10 8.70
M Age 39.29 8.15 39.49 8.98
M is > 5 years older 0.19 0.39 0.21 0.40
F is > 5 years older 0.03 0.16 0.04 0.20
F Education level 1 (lowest) 0.43 0.49 0.34 0.47
F Education level 2 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.28
F Education level 3 0.26 0.44 0.26 0.44
F Education level 4 0.10 0.31 0.12 0.33
F Education level 5 0.06 0.24 0.11 0.32
M Education level 1 (lowest) 0.34 0.47 0.39 0.49
M Education level 2 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.25
M Education level 3 0.35 0.48 0.32 0.47
M Education level 4 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.29
M Education level 5 0.06 0.25 0.06 0.24
Married 0.84 0.37 0.68 0.46
Number of children 1.97 1.34 1.27 1.16
Children, age < 3 0.23 0.42 0.12 0.32
Ile de France 0.14 0.35 0.21 0.41
Paris 0.12 0.32 0.19 0.39
F French nationality 0.87 0.34 0.88 0.33
M French nationality 0.87 0.34 0.83 0.37
Same socio-economic class 0.02 0.15 0.06 0.25
Same education level 0.43 0.49 0.41 0.49
F cohort born after 1964 0.30 0.46 0.30 0.46
M cohort born after 1964 0.20 0.40 0.24 0.42
F cohort born 1955-1964 0.38 0.48 0.35 0.48
M cohort born 1955-1964 0.37 0.48 0.32 0.47
F Monthly gross W, Euros 975 1423
M Monthly gross W, Euros 1494 1383
These are unweighted figures, averaged over the thirteen-year period 1990-2002.
Male (female) breadwinners are defined as husband(wife)-sole-earner couples.
Current wages are averaged only over positive values and measured in Euros.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics: dual-earners by outearning relationship
Variable Dual-earners, Wm>Wf Dual-earners, Wm≤Wf
N = 116720 N =35662
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
F Age 37.09 8.15 36.93 8.16
M Age 39.21 8.12 38.22 8.36
M is > 5 years older 0.14 0.35 0.11 0.31
F is > 5 years older 0.02 0.15 0.04 0.20
F Education level 1 (lowest) 0.26 0.44 0.13 0.33
F Education level 2 0.09 0.29 0.07 0.26
F Education level 3 0.30 0.46 0.24 0.43
F Education level 4 0.15 0.36 0.17 0.38
F Education level 5 0.13 0.33 0.23 0.42
M Education level 1 (lowest) 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.43
M Education level 2 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.26
M Education level 3 0.37 0.48 0.38 0.48
M Education level 4 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.32
M Education level 5 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.29
Married 0.80 0.40 0.74 0.44
Number of children 1.39 1.04 1.19 0.98
Children, age < 3 0.12 0.33 0.14 0.35
Ile de France 0.18 0.38 0.20 0.40
Paris 0.15 0.36 0.17 0.38
F French nationality 0.94 0.24 0.96 0.19
M French nationality 0.93 0.25 0.94 0.24
Same socio-economic class 0.11 0.31 0.16 0.37
Same education level 0.40 0.49 0.35 0.48
F cohort born after 1964 0.28 0.45 0.31 0.46
M cohort born after 1964 0.21 0.40 0.27 0.44
F cohort born 1955-1964 0.38 0.49 0.38 0.49
M cohort born 1955-1964 0.36 0.48 0.37 0.48
F Monthly gross W, Euros 927 555 1534 1661
M Monthly gross W, Euros 1615 1227 1155 496
These are unweighted sample figures, averaged over the thirteen-year period 1990-2002.
Current wages are averaged only over positive values. They are measured in Euros.
Table 5: Sample distribution of gross monthly earnings
Dual earn. Dual earn. Male Female
Variable Wm>Wf Wm≤Wf breadw. breadw.
N =116720 N = 31572 N = 75022 N = 1110
Q1 F (25%) 610 1118 610
Median F (50%) 885 1372 893
Q3 F (75%) 1159 1692 1212
Mean F 927 1534 975
Standard deviation F 555 1661 1422
Q1 M (25%) 1112 915 978
Median M (50%) 1387 1082 1220
Q3 M (75%) 1829 1334 1651
Mean M 1615 1155 1493
Standard deviation M 1227 496 1383
These are unweighted sample figures, averaged over the thirteen-year period 1990-2002.
Current wages are averaged only over positive values. They are measured in Euros.
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Table 6: Fitted probabilities (averaged over all observations)
Both out of work 0.037
Only wife works 0.043
Only husband works 0.32
Dual-earners 0.60
Dual-earners wf > wm 0.26
Table 7: Marginal eﬀects on the probability of employment
Both out Only Only Dual joint prob
of work wife husband earners dual earn.
works works wf > wm
Education and socio-economic status (reference: education level 6)
Education level 1, wife 0.020 -0.020 0.221 -0.221 -0.314
Education level 2, wife 0.011 -0.011 0.113 -0.113 -0.302
Education level 3, wife 0.009 -0.009 0.090 -0.090 -0.301
Education level 4, wife 0.005 -0.005 0.047 -0.047 -0.262
Education level 5, wife 0.0003 -0.0003 0.003 -0.003 -0.167
Education level 1, husband 0.011 0.062 -0.011 -0.062 0.408
Education level 2, husband 0.007 0.037 -0.007 -0.037 0.364
Education level 3, husband 0.006 0.035 -0.006 -0.035 0.397
Education level 4, husband 0.003 0.016 -0.003 -0.016 0.308
Education level 5, husband 0.002 0.008 -0.002 -0.008 0.201
Spouses same education level -0.001 -0.006 0.007 -0.0002/ 0.002
Same educ. lev * low education 0.007 0.040 -0.006 -0.041 -0.015
Same socio-economic category -0.009 -0.014 -0.069 0.092 0.012
Age and cohort eﬀects (age + 1 year, reference cohort: 1965+)
Age of wife -0.0001 0.0001 -0.001 0.001 0.0001
Age of husband 0.0001 0.001 -0.0001 -0.001 -0.0002
Husband older by >5 years 0.006 0.021 0.011 -0.038 -0.010
Wife older by >3 years 0.006 0.019 0.012 -0.036 -0.009
Husband’s cohort post-1964 -0.0002/ -0.001 0.0002/ 0.001 / 0.001
Husband’s cohort 1955-1964 -0.001 -0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001
Wife’s cohort post-1964 0.002 -0.002 0.020 -0.020 -0.002
Wife’s cohort 1955-1964 -0.0001/ 0.0001/ -0.001 / 0.001 / 0.0001/
Family characteristics (reference, married, no children under 3)
Cohabiting couple 0.008 0.048 -0.009 -0.047 -0.018
Number of children 0.003 -0.004 0.035 -0.035 -0.004
Any children under 3 0.008 -0.003 0.072 -0.077 -0.010
Nationality and community (reference: non-French)
French nationality husband -0.007 -0.035 0.007 0.035 0.013
French nationality wife -0.004 0.004 -0.035 0.035 0.003
Small community -0.003 -0.012 -0.004 0.019 0.005
Unemployment rates (+ 1 percentage point)
Unemployment rate men -0.004 0.005 / -0.038 0.037 0.003 /
Unemployment rate women 0.008 0.005 / 0.050 -0.063 -0.010
All eﬀects are significant at the 5% level, except
* = significant at the 10% level, and / = p-value greater than 0.10
Marginal eﬀects are computed with reference to deviations from sample means.
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Table A: Employment Equations
variable Husbands Wives
Coeﬃcient Standard Coeﬃcient Standard
estimate error estimate error
Intercept -8.201 0.980 -13.714 0.827
Ln age 6.312 0.504 9.548 0.431
Square of ln age -0.885 0.070 -1.290 0.061
Education level 1 (lowest) -0.463 0.015 -1.334 0.014
Education level 2 -0.303 0.017 -0.789 0.014
Education level 3 -0.291 0.013 -0.655 0.012
Education level 4 -0.142 0.016 -0.374 0.013
Education level 5 -0.079 0.017 -0.029 0.013
Cohabiting couple -0.373 0.008 0.004 0.008
Number of children 0.001 0.003 -0.289 0.003
Any children under 3 -0.044 0.010 -0.549 0.009
Champagne Ardenne -0.049 0.019 -0.418 0.016
Haute Normandie -0.128 0.017 -0.330 0.016
Basse Normandie -0.094 0.021 -0.101 0.018
Picardie -0.107 0.017 -0.364 0.016
Centre 0.010 0.018 -0.160 0.016
Bourgogne 0.003 0.019 -0.239 0.017
Calais -0.257 0.013 -0.555 0.012
Lorraine 0.029 0.019 -0.378 0.015
Alsace 0.124 0.020 -0.205 0.016
Franche Comte 0.139 0.020 -0.255 0.017
Loire -0.019 0.017 -0.137 0.014
Bretagne -0.086 0.017 -0.210 0.015
Poitou Charente -0.116 0.019 -0.259 0.017
Aquitaine -0.118 0.017 -0.388 0.014
Midi Pyrenees -0.123 0.019 -0.294 0.016
Limousin 0.044 0.022 -0.124 0.020
Rhones Alpes 0.013 0.013 -0.261 0.012
Auvergne -0.007 0.021 -0.353 0.018
Languedoc Roussillon -0.414 0.017 -0.635 0.017
Provence -0.288 0.013 -0.617 0.013
French nationality 0.496 0.009 0.369 0.009
Small community 0.136 0.007 0.061 0.006
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Table A: Employment Equations (ctd.)
variable Husbands Wives
Coeﬃcient Standard Coeﬃcient Standard
estimate error estimate error
Spouses same education level 0.061 0.009 -0.054 0.007
Same socio-economic class 0.225 0.009 0.973 0.008
Same educ. lev * low education -0.324 0.014 -0.013 0.012
Husband older by >5 years -0.200 0.008 -0.138 0.008
Wife older by >3 years -0.184 0.011 -0.137 0.010
Unemployment rate men -0.008 0.045 0.409 0.039
Unemployment rate women -0.102 0.054 -0.416 0.048
1993 -0.017 0.051 -0.348 0.045
1994 0.035 0.070 -0.532 0.062
1995 0.065 0.046 -0.213 0.041
1996 0.140 0.059 -0.319 0.052
1997 0.102 0.072 -0.549 0.063
1998 0.089 0.059 -0.407 0.052
1999 0.008 0.067 -0.547 0.058
2000 -0.109 0.071 -0.487 0.063
2001 -0.176 0.075 -0.381 0.066
2002 -0.297 0.133 -0.867 0.118
Cohort born after 1964 0.013 0.020 -0.173 0.018
Cohort born 1955-1964 0.039 0.012 0.012 0.011
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Table B: Wage Equations
variable Husbands Wives
Coeﬃcient Standard Coeﬃcient Standard
estimate error estimate error
Intercept -2.968 0.006 -3.076 0.006
Ln (1+exp) 0.013 0.006 -0.011 0.005
Square of ln (1+exp) 0.046 0.001 0.047 0.001
Education level 1 (lowest) -0.668 0.022 -0.655 0.009
Education level 2 -0.443 0.037 -0.392 0.023
Education level 3 -0.716 0.015 -0.516 0.013
Education level 4 -0.314 0.014 -0.447 0.012
Education level 5 -0.408 0.013 -0.226 0.010
Education level 1xln(1+exp) 0.061 0.016 0.015 0.007
Education level 2xln(1+exp) -0.126 0.026 -0.202 0.017
Education level 3xln(1+exp) 0.111 0.011 -0.091 0.010
Education level 4xln(1+exp) -0.159 0.011 -0.091 0.010
Education level 5xln(1+exp) 0.074 0.011 -0.064 0.009
Education level 1xln(1+exp)2 -0.031 0.003 -0.034 0.002
Education level 2xln(1+exp)2 0.027 0.004 0.029 0.003
Education level 3xln(1+exp)2 -0.029 0.002 0.006 0.002
Education level 4xln(1+exp)2 0.039 0.002 0.023 0.002
Education level 5xln(1+exp)2 -0.009 0.002 0.016 0.002
Ile de France 0.128 0.001 0.144 0.001
1991 0.024 0.002 0.008 0.002
1992 0.077 0.002 0.073 0.002
1993 0.097 0.002 0.096 0.002
1994 0.088 0.002 0.091 0.002
1995 0.100 0.002 0.105 0.002
1996 0.106 0.002 0.081 0.002
1997 0.113 0.002 0.120 0.002
1998 0.127 0.002 0.131 0.002
1999 0.132 0.002 0.139 0.002
2000 0.167 0.002 0.167 0.002
2001 0.173 0.002 0.165 0.002
2002 0.221 0.002 0.214 0.002
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Table C: Parameter estimates of the covariance matrices
Parameter Parameter Standard
estimate error
The covariance matrix of the idiosyncratic errors
σmf, (labour market status spouses) -0.016 0.005
σm,u (lab. market status and wage rate husband) -0.035 0.019
σmf,u (lab. market status husb, wage rate wife) -0.011 0.005
σfm,u (lab. market status wife, wage rate husband) -0.025 0.003
σf,u (lab. market status and wage rate wife) -0.069 0.009
τm (std dev. wage rate husband) 0.149 0.000
τmf (cov. wage rates husband and wife) 0.323 0.001
τf (std dev. wage rate wife) 0.134 0.000
The covariance matrix of the random eﬀects
σm,α (std. dev. random eﬀect lab. market status husband) 0.540 0.005
ρmf,α (corr. labour market status husband and wife) 0.427 0.003
ρm,αω (labour market status and wage rate husband) 0.161 0.001
ρmf,αω (labour market status husband, wage rate wife) 0.266 0.001
σf,α (std. dev. random eﬀect lab. market status wife) 1.305 0.005
ρfm,αω (labour market status wife, wage rate husband) -0.033 0.001
ρf,αω (labour market status and wage rate wife) 0.965 0.001
σω,m (std. dev. random eﬀect wage rate husband) 0.298 0.000
ρω,mf (corr. random eﬀects wage rate husband and wife) 0.121 0.001
σω,f (std. dev. random eﬀect wage rate wife) 0.338 0.000
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